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Geoffrey J. Butler, Clerk AUGl 1988 
Utah Supreme Court 
322 State Capitol Building 
S a l t Lake C i t y , UT 84114 Clerk, Supreme Court, Utah 
Re: Madsen v. Prudential 
Case No. 860148 
Dear Mr. Butler: 
As permitted by Rule 24(j) of the Rules of the Utah 
Supreme Court, Prudential Federal Savings & loan Association 
makes a brief response to the letter of supplemental 
authorities (dated July 20, 1988) submitted by the Madsens. 
Their letter refers to six case opinions. They merit a brief 
comment. 
The Madsens first cite In Re Cement and Concrete 
Antitrust Litigation, 515 F. Supp. 1076, 1080 (D. Ariz. 1981). 
The portion of the opinion they quote suggests a judge need not 
be disqualified for having a potential interest in the outcome 
of an action if he first learns of the interest only after the 
action is underway and if the interest is "small." Not so. 
The United States Supreme Court cited In Re Cement in Lilieberq 
v. Health Services Acquisition Corp., U.S. , 56 
U.S.L.W. 4637, 4641, N. 9 (U.S. June 17, 1988) (No. 86-957). 
After noting the administrative difficulties posed to a judge 
who is monitoring for interest, the Court concluded: 
Of course, notwithstanding the size and complexity of 
the litigation, judges remain under a duty to stay 
informed of any personal or fiduciary financial 
interest they may have in cases over which they 
preside. 
Id. Here, Judge Rigtrup never recused himself although he was 
aware of his financial interest even before he was assigned the 
case. Remember, Judge Rigtrup had presided 
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over the four earlier interest-on-reserve cases. He believed 
(albeit mistakenly) that he had disclosed his Prudential 
mortgage in a meeting related to those actions. See Brief of 
Respondent (at 6, 9). This is not a situation where the judge 
inadvertently discovered his interest mid-way through the 
litigation. It is noteworthy that the district judge who 
presided over In Re Cement, and whose opinion the madsens 
quote, did recuse himself after learning of his potential 
interest. 
The remaining five cases cited by the Madsens are 
readily distinguishable. In each of them, the party moving for 
disqualification knew of the grounds for disqualification long 
before the judges considered the merits of the actions. That 
is not this case. Here, the conduct requiring disqualification 
occurred after trial. See Brief of Respondent, Point IV (at 
42-43). 
Please bring this letter (and the enclosed nine 
copies) to the attention of the Court. 
Sincerely yours, 
JJP/j f 
cc: Robert J. Debry, of 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Appellants 
Peter W. Billings, of 
FABIAN 8c CLENDENIN 
Attorneys for Amicus Curiae 
jQS*6jph J.^Palmer 
